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Abstract—A successful experimental second order 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on an Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) hardware implementation on flash-based FPGA 
technology with improved product combining function is 
achieved. Our choice to this combining function is justified. An 
experimental set-up is elaborated to implement on an FPGA 
board critical AES modules and DPA attack. As main 
contribution, this work proved the success of experimental 
second order DPA attack on Flash-based FPGA with improved 
product combining function.  
Keywords: AES, Second order DPA,Combining function, 
masking schemes. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Side Channel analysis SCA exploits information that leaks 
from physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. 
This leakage can be the power consumption, the 
electromagnetic emanations, or time execution of the 
cryptographic implementation. It is used to extract information 
on the secret data manipulated by the implementation. If the 
leakage channel is the power consumption of the design, the 
attack is called power analysis attack. In this set of attack, there 
are many types. The first one is the Simple Power Analysis 
SPA [1].  The adversary, in this attack, uses directly the trace 
of power consumption to retrieve the secret key. The second 
one is the Differential Power Analysis DPA [1]. A DPA  attack 
is a statistical one that correlates a physical leakage with a 
prediction on the values taken by one or several intermediate 
variable of the implementation that depend on both the 
plaintext and the secret key.  This attack can be done in the first 
or second order. The difference between the two order that on 
the first one, the adversary manipulate directly the power 
consumption traces, on the second one, he combine the same 
power traces. Moreover in the second order DPA attack, the 
design under attack must be protected from the first order DPA 
attack. 
To avoid information leakage, the manipulation of sensitive 
variables must be protected by adding countermeasures to the 
algorithm. This paper only deals with algorithm Advanced 
Encryption Standard AES [2].  It is the most used algorithm 
since 2001. A very common countermeasure to protect AES 
implementations is to randomize their sensitive variables by 
masking techniques [3].  Canright et al[4] propose in 2008 a 
very compact masked SubBytes function for the AES cipher. 
Generally this countermeasure protects the AES 
implementation only from the first order DPA order attack. In 
the second order DPA [1], the adversary combines the power 
consumption and use a correlation analysis attack in the 
preprocessing data. The efficiency of the second order DPA 
attack is based on the choice of the combining function. The 
most used ones are the product and the absolute function. E. 
Prouff et al. [5] improve the product combining function. They 
show that is more efficient than the absolute for software 
implementation. In our work, we show that this combining 
function is also suitable to hardware implementation. 
Previous research works presented interesting results 
relative to DPA implementations for different VLSI 
technologies. A great interest was given to DPA FPGA 
implementation but published works were limited to SRAM-
based FPGA technologies [3-7]. 
In this paper, authors propose an experimental 
implementation on Flash-based FPGA of a second order DPA 
attack on AES. The objective is to verify the robust of this very 
attractive FPGA technology to higher order DPA attacks. In 
fact the interest for Flash-based technology comes from its 
great performance in term of low power consumption [8]. Actel 
Fusion FPGA, considered in this work, offers several sleep and 
standby modes of operation to further extend battery life in 
embedded applications.  
This paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we describe 
the concept of second order DPA attack.  In section 3, we give 
details of the implementation under attack. It is a masked AES 
implementation using the most compact SubBytes function. In 
section 4, we show our experimental results of second DPA 
attack on masked AES implementation with improved product 
combining function. In section 5, we conclude. 
II. CONCEPT OF SECOND ORDER DPA ATTACK 
A. Attack description  
Second order DPA attack is introduced by Paul Kocher [1]. 
It is considered as High Order DPA attack (HOPDA) [5]. Its 
objective is  recovering information on  Z= g(X,K) and then the 
correct key K by simultaneously considering the leakage 
signals at the two times t1 and t2 that correspond to the 
manipulations of two intermediate values. The attack starts by 
combining the two signals L(t1) and L(t2) with a combining 
function C and by defining a prediction function f according to 
some assumptions on the device leakage model. Then, for 
every guess k on the value of the secret K, the attacker 
computes the so-called prediction f  g(X, k) and checks its 
validity by estimating the following correlation coefficient  
                               (1) 
The correlation coefficient k for the key k is defined as 
follow:  
   
                            
                            
 (2) 
Where Cov(X,Y) is the covariance function between 
variables X and Y. (X) is the standard deviation function of the 
variable X. If the functions f and C are well chosen, the attacker 
will have a higher correlation coefficient for the correct key K. 
To estimate the correlation coefficient k, the attacker process 
N leakage measurements L1(t),  …, LN(t). For every key k, the 
estimation of k is obtained by computing Pearson 
coefficient        between the samples f  g (Xi, k) and 
C(Li(t1) ,Li(t2)) i[1..N]  (Xi is the plaintext). Pearson 
Coefficient is defined as follow for samples xi, yi i[1..N]   : 
          
             
 
   
        
  
           
  
   
 (3) 
As         tends to k when N increases, for N large 
enough large, the correct key is that maximizes       .  
Processing in second order DPA attack can be summarized 
by the figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Principales steps of second order DPA attack. 
B. Classification of combing function C  for second order 
DPA attack 
In the literature, there are two main combining functions C 
for the leakage signals for second DPA order attack. They are 
product combining function and the absolute difference one. 
1) Product combining function for second order DPA 
attack 
The product combining function is defined as follow  
                                   (4) 
It is first combining function introduced by Chari et al 
in[12]. This function has already been studied by Schramm et 
al. in [6].  In [5], E. Prouff et al. give an improvement to 
product combining function Cp: 
                                                  (5) 
They show that this combining function is the most 
efficient one for software implementation. In our work, we will 
proof that this improved combining function is suitable to 
hardware implementation also.  
2) Absolute difference combining function for second DPA 
attack 
The absolute difference combining function, is given by the 
equation (6) 
                                 (6) 
The absolute difference combining is introduced by 
Messerges [13]. It has already been studied by Joye et al. in 
[7]. In their paper, the authors consider the idealized model and 
analyze a single-bit second order DPA attack. In [8], Oswald et 
al. realize a practical implementation of second order DPA 
attack using the absolute difference combining function. 
3) Sine-Based Combining Function 
In [14], Oswald et al. propose a combining function based 
on the sine function. It takes as parameters the exact Hamming 
weights of the mask and of the masked variable: 
                                   
  (7) 
They also suggest using the above combining function 
together with the following prediction function: 
                         
                   
                   
(8) 
In ideal case without considering noise signal and attacking 
the 8 bits, the use of the couple Csin and Fsin allows an attacker 
to reach a correlation of 0.83, which is quite high. However, in 
noisy model this correlation decreases rapidly. We conclude 
that the sine-based combining function is not suitable for 
experimental attack of second order attack. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF MASKED AES  
Second order DPA attacks concern the protected design 
from the first order DPA attack. The common countermeasure 
is algorithmic one and specially the masking method. It is 
customized for the AES was the transformed masking method 
[3] by Akkar et al. This method was further simplified by 
Trichina et al. [9]. It was noticed in [9, 10, 3] that the 
multiplicative masking introduced in [3] masked only non-zero 
values, i.e., a zero byte will not get masked because of the 
multiplicative nature of the mask. This feature renders the 
method of Akkar vulnerable to DPAs. A second masking 
technique for AES is the random representation method by 
Golic [10]. Similar to Akkar, Golic do not try to show that their 
technique randomizes all intermediate results. Instead, the 
authors only argue experimentally that using their methods the 
Hamming weights of all intermediate results are distributed in 
roughly the same way, independent of the plaintext and secret 
key. However two of them, [3] and [10], are both susceptible to 
a certain type of (first-order) differential side-channel attack, 
the zero-value attack. The latter one has turned out to be 
vulnerable even to standard differential side-channel attacks as 
well. Oswald et al. in [11] combine the concepts of 
multiplicative and additive masking. They show the resistance 
of their implementation. 
The idea of masking the intermediate values inside a 
cryptographic algorithm is suggested in several papers [3, 5, 8] 
as a possible countermeasure to power analysis. The technique 
is generally applicable if all the fundamental operations used in 
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a given algorithm can be rewritten in the masked domain. This 
is easily seen to be the case in classical algorithms such as 
AES. Figure 2 illustrates the implementation of masked AES. 
The details of the masking countermeasure are as follows: 
the input of a cipher is blinded with random masks, which 
diffuse and propagate during the execution of the cipher. As a 
result, the side channel leakage of all intermediate, key 
dependent variables, which are processed by the cipher, does 
not correlate with the corresponding unmasked variables  and 
side channel attacks are effectively thwarted. The most 
important step is the final mask correction which removes the 
evolved masks from the output of the cipher. While it is simple 
to reproduce the propagation of masks throughout linear 
functions in a cipher, non-linear functions, such as the 
substitution function on AES algorithm, require a considerable 
effort when it comes to the correction step. In our work, we use 
the most compact masked S-box introduced in [4] by Canright 
et al. They use many corrections terms to achieve the mask in 
substitution function. They optimize the work of Oswald et al. 
[11] by introducing normal basis in masked S-Box. 
IV. RESULT OF EXPERIMENTAL SECOND ORDER DPA 
ATTACK  
A. Experiemental setup for second order DPA attack 
 Second order DPA attack is done on traces of power 
consumption of the design under attack. Running a cipher on 
this design, the attacker measures the corresponding signals. 
He needs essentially a digital oscilloscope, computer and 
FPGA board. The figure 3 summarizes the essentials 
components of signals acquisition. He realizes the 
communication between the PC and scope by General Purpose 
Interface Bus GPIB IEEE-488. The digital oscilloscope has 
100 MHz bandwidth and 200 MS/s maximum rate sampling. 
The FPGA board is the Actel flash fusion AFS-600. He 
measures the power consumption of our design in the FPGA 
board by inserting a 0.2  resistor between the power supply 
and the FPGA Board. A signal trigger is generated by the 
FPGA board to synchronize acquisition of power consumption 
and time execution of the design under attack. 
 
Figure 2.  Architecture of masked AES 
DPA attacks are generally realized on the first round with 
known plaintext or on the last round with known cipher text. In 
our case, we will realize the DPA attack with known plaintext 
using the Hamming weight model. The design under attack is 
illustrated in figure 4. It is composed by three modules: Add 
mask, AddRoundKey and Masked SubBytes. This attack is done 
in the 8 bits of the output of Masked SubBytes. We use the 
correlation analysis to predict the correct key. 
 
Figure 3.  Experimental lab od DPA attack 
 
Figure 4.  Design under Second order DPA attack 
B. Results of first order DPA attack on masked AES 
This subsection shows the resistance of the masked 
countermeasure for the first DPA attack. The figure 5 
illustrates an unsuccessful DPA attack. This result is given by 
the fact of the efficiency of the masked countermeasure. The 
correct key is equal to 43. The false on is 252. The number of 
traces is 20480. 
 
Figure 5.  Unsucessuful first order DPA attack on design secured with 
masking with correct key K=43 and with 20480 traces 
C. Results of second DPA attack on masked AES with 
improved product combining function 
We use the improved product combining function described 
in the equation 5. It is shown that is the most efficient one for 
the attack on software implementation. First, we evaluate the 
mean of leakage for different sample the power consumption 
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traces in order to evaluate E(L(ti)). We subtract this mean for 
all the point to have a leakage centered in zero. For each 
instants t1and t2 in the power consumption traces we multiply 
their centered leakage. After the preprocessing step realized by 
this combined function, we use the correlation analysis to 
retrieve secret key. Figure 6 shows a successful attack with 
20480 traces of power consumption. The correct key is 43. 
This result demonstrates the efficiency of the improved product 
combining function of second order DPA attack for hardware 
implementation. 
 
Figure 6.  Succesufull second order DPA attack on masking countermeasure 
with K= 43 and 20480 traces with improved product combining function 
D. Results of second DPA attack on masked AES with 
absolute combining function 
In this experimental implementation of second order DPA 
attack, we use the absolute combining function described by 
the equation 6. For each instants t1and t2, we calculate the 
absolute difference leakage between L(t1) and L(t2). The 
numbers of traces is the same as the previous second order 
DPA attack with improved product combining function. We 
use the correlation analysis on processed leakage. The result is 
that the correct key is not detected for all the traces power 
consumption. That implies this combining function needs more 
traces than with improved product one. This emphasizes the 
fact that the improved product combining function is more 
suitable for experimental attack on hardware design. 
V. CONCLUSION  
An experimental implementation of a second order 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack for Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm on Flash-
based FPGA is proposed. After analyzing processing 
requirements for two different combining functions for second 
order DPA attack, the choice of the improved product 
combining function is justified. An experimental set-up is 
defined to implement on an FPGA board critical AES modules 
and DPA attack. Main contribution of our work is relative to 
proving for the first time, according to our knowledge, the 
success of second order DPA attack on Flash-based FPGA 
technology with the improved product function. Experimental 
results showed that for different secret key values a maximum 
of correlation with the correct key is obtained during 48 h of 
data acquisition and processing time. Hence this paper 
contribution shows that this new and low-power technology 
suffers also from the higher order of side channels attacks. It 
becomes necessary to define suitable countermeasure for DPA 
attacks to protect the key. Authors proposed in [7] a masking 
scheme for SRAM-based FPGA technology. Moreover, we 
show that the combining improved product function is the most 
efficient than the absolute difference combining function for 
second order DPA attack on hardware design. 
Ongoing research is being carried by authors to define 
second order DPA countermeasure technique for Flash-based 
FPGA technology and introducing a novel combining function. 
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